Apollo 1 An Engineering Disaster
Introduction :
During the 50’s in the height of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the US was falling behind in the race for space. Early in the decade of the 60’s, President John F. Kennedy laid down the gauntlet that the US would be the first nation to land a person safely on the moon. From that point forward NASA had enormous pressure to achieve this dramatic and ambitious goal. Beginning with the Mercury and Gemini Projects, NASA pushed the engineering envelope. On January 27th, 1967, the United State’s steadfastness for its pursuit of dominance in space would be tested to its core and NASA would never be the same again. That afternoon a preflight test in Cape Canaveral Florida for the Apollo 204 mission was taking shape. The veteran crew consisted of Edward White, Gus Grissom, and Roger Chaffee. The preflight test began around 1 PM when the crew arrived inside the capsule. As the procedures of the test were being carried out, many problems plagued the team and prolonged the completion time. At 6:31 PM, a short circuit occurred in the AC Bus 2 voltage, causing a fire to breakout inside the cockpit. The capsule was closed by an inward-opening hatch that was held by multiple latches and was also pressurized with pure oxygen that exceeded the atmospheric pressure outside. Fire spread quickly. The crew was unable to open the hatch. Cries of “we have a fire in the cockpit” from the ground loop radio transmission between Apollo One, the Operations and Checkout Building, and the Complex 34 blockhouse control room were heard moments before the crew perished. Three lives were lost on this day, and it would be 20 months later before NASA would send another man into space. In honor of their deaths, the Apollo 204 mission was renamed to Apollo 1.
Engineering Perspective :
The disaster began when the “AC Bus 2 voltage” surged indicating a short circuit. The spread of the fire was not slow, as many of the components within the capsule were flammable. Both the flammable components and the oxygen level it gave fire a perfect environment to spread – and spread very quickly. The short circuit occurred after a momentary power failure that blew the AC Bus 2. Several arcs were found along this circuit indicating the fire did not have only one point of origin.
From an engineering perspective, many lessons were learned on this day that ultimately led to the success of the Apollo 11 moon landing. Two of the most immediate results of this tragedy were the redesign of the hatch door and the replacement and removal of flammable materials within the cockpit. The hatch door was replaced with one that opened outwardly. The latch design was also changed for a faster escape in the event of an emergency. Flammable substances inside the capsule, including the crew’s spacesuits, were also replaced with non-flammable, and in some instances self extinguishing, materials.
Free Body Diagram of Hatch :
Lessons Learned :
I have been very fascinated with the Apollo program and NASA since I was young. At an early age I visited Cape Canaveral and saw first-hand information about the tragedies, improvements and triumphs of NASA. Through my research of the Apollo 1 mission, I gained a deeper understanding of how this disaster changed NASA. I learned how seemingly inconsequential engineering decisions can have enormous life-changing impacts. And, engineers, no matter how complex the challenge may be, must take into consideration the smallest details. The Apollo Project, as well as its predecessor projects, were rushed in every way possible to win the space race. NASA executives were forced to roll out extremely tight deadlines that were often not met. At the time these “behind closed doors” events were kept very private to protect the integrity of the space program. The Apollo 1 tragedy marked the end of the rushed, messy engineering practices and transformed NASA’s procedures and processes into the well-oiled machine that NASA is today. This disaster helped pave the way for a more thought-out development process that fostered a more open environment for which potential problems and design flaws could be discussed. Many new procedures were implemented, accountability levels were increased, and safety became the number one priority. Since this malfunction occurred pre-flight, NASA was able to investigate the evidence that would not have been available had the tragedy been post-launch. Leveraging this information, NASA was able to develop solutions not only for the specific circumstances that led to the deadly accident but also other scenarios that had not been considered. As evidenced by the well-known Apollo 13 in-space explosion incident, cutting-edge engineering will always be inherently dangerous. But, the change in philosophy at NASA after the Apollo 1 disaster is what helped to bring back the crew of Apollo 13 alive. While engineering decisions must be balanced with economic realities, these type disasters need to remind and teach engineers not to acquiesce to those who do not have the knowledge our discipline provides.
Resources :
“Apollo 1.” NASA, NASA, nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/lunar/apollo1info.html.
“NASA Apollo Mission Apollo-1-- Findings, Determinations and Recommendations- Apollo 204 Review Board.” NASA, NASA, www.hq.nasa.gov/pao/History/Apollo204/find.html.
Staff. “Apollo 1.” Engineering.com, www.engineering.com/Blogs/tabid/3207/ArticleID/67/categoryId/7/Apollo-1.aspx.